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INTERROGATION REPORT

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COUNTRY : SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN) NIC REPORT NO : 236/68
SUBJECT : NIC CASE NO : FET 3.3(h)(2)
Company 1, Main Force Battalion, Military Region 3. DATE OF REPORT: 2/3/68
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OF ACQUISITION : SAIGON, VIETNAM

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1. Company 1 quartered in TAY NINH Province near the Cambodian border to carry out rice transportation missions from August 1966 to mid-1967. The unit travelled from its camp to the Cambodian border twice a month to collect rice. Each man normally carried about 20 kilos, but the weaker among them carried only about 15. The unit never saw any personnel at the rice storage area. Located at the area was a building which housed about 100 wooden barrels, each holding about 40 litres of rice. Since members of this unit were serving time as punishment, the VC did not trust them with weapons and only armed the unit's five guards with CKC and AKA rifles. The unit usually left its quartering site at 0500 hours and arrived at the rice storage area at 1700 hours; it made the return trip immediately. The rice was stored in a hut at the quartering site. No other units were located in this area.
2. On 30 January 1968, Battalion Commander BA HOC advised Company 1 that it was to move to Saigon at 1800 hours that date to attack the GVN radio station there. The soldiers received no training prior to the attack; however, the unit had been in combat on three occasions while it was quartered in BIEN HOA Province in 1967. Led by [] Source's unit began walking at 1800 and arrived in Saigon at 2400. Source carried an AKA rifle with 300 rounds, but he had only four magazines. Because Source was ill, another comrade helped him carry his ammunition. The other members of the company carried AKA rifles with 300 rounds of ammunition and two grenades each. One soldier carried a B40, and another four B40 shells. The company's strength had been depleted in previous actions during the past six months; 15 men had been killed or wounded in an engagement with GVN troops at VINH PHU, and 25 in VINH BINH. 3.3(h)(2)
3. Company 1 attacked the Saigon radio station at midnight 31 January 1968 and met with resistance from GVN forces. The attack failed: after three hours of fighting, the VC had to withdraw, hide their weapons, and escape. Their orders had been to occupy the station. However, the Battalion Commander had given no other instructions as to how long to remain there or what to do after the attack. The men knew that no reinforcements or reserves would be sent in to help them. [] fled the scene. After Source and two comrades threw their weapons away, they wandered around the city and at 0700 hours were stopped by two GVN policemen, who asked for their papers. The police arrested the VC who then led them to the place where they had concealed their weapons. 3.3(h)(2)
4. Company 1 was given no briefings on other units going to the Saigon area and, since the companies of its battalion did not quarter together, no one knew where they were deployed. No women were included in Company 1, and the soldiers did not receive any pills to keep them awake the night before the attack. The company received no support from the local people either before, during, or after the attack. When people saw Source and his comrades, they closed and locked their doors. Source had no escape plan set up; he and his comrades were trying to find a car when they were arrested by the GVN police.
5. Throughout the TET attack Source and his comrades had poor morale. They did not want to fight because after three prior combat actions they were discouraged and afraid to die; they were afraid of failing in Saigon and were very surprised at the order to fight there. Twelve of Source's comrades had previously tried to escape to return to their families; Source claimed that he had tried unsuccessfully to escape on three occasions. [] often tried to motivate Source and to calm his fears; 3.3(h)(2)

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the company commander did not take away Source's probationary membership in the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP), but kept him under surveillance. Source did not know about other areas of fighting in Saigon or in the countryside. Informed only of his unit's immediate objective, he had no information about future attacks on the city, or how the failure of this attack would be explained away by the Liberation Front and the HANOI Government.

6. (Interrogator's Comment: Until the clemency policy was explained to Source after an hour of interrogation, Source was highly uncooperative. Afterwards, although still resisting, Source volunteered a little information although he took great care in answering questions and was probably lying. He had little or no concept of dates and is illiterate.

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